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iAbstract
This paper reevaluates the quantitative performance of the standard labor-market
matching model developed by Mortensen and Pissarides [28] with special attention
to the behavior of vacancies, one of the key variables in the model. I ¯rst estimate
trivariate vector autoregressions with gross worker °ows and vacancies and identify
an aggregate shock by imposing only minimal sign restrictions on the responses of
worker °ows and employment growth and no restrictions on the response of vacancies.
The data strongly suggest a hump-shaped and persistent response of vacancies. The
calibrated model, on the other hand, predicts that vacancies respond to aggregate
shocks with no delay and are not persistent even though an aggregate productivity
shock is assumed to be highly persistent. These problems in vacancy behavior also
cause gross °ow series to exhibit counterfactual cyclical properties.
JEL codes: E24, J63, J64
Keywords: Agnostic identi¯cation, labor-market matching, unemployment, vacan-
cies, worker °ows.
ii1 Introduction
The labor-market matching model developed by Pissarides [30], [32], and Mortensen and
Pissarides [28] provides a coherent framework to analyze dynamic behavior of gross worker
(or job) °ows, employment, and job vacancies, and thus has become popular in macro-labor
literature. Re°ecting this popularity, there have been a number of attempts in the literature
to quantitatively evaluate the performance of this class of models. For example, Cole and
Rogerson [14] examine the model's ability to deliver plausible cyclical properties of job °ows
and employment in a reduced-form framework. Collard et al. [15] estimate the structural
parameters and undertake formal statistical tests of the model. Overall, the conclusion
from these studies is that the framework does a good job in explaining important empirical
regularities regarding labor-market °ows and employment in the U.S. There are also attempts
that embed the labor-matching friction into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models with capital and a risk-averse household. Andolfatto [2], Merz [26], and den Haan et
al. [19] integrate the matching framework into otherwise-standard real business cycle models
and show that their extensions signi¯cantly improve the models' performance in propagating
the underlying technology shocks. Cooley and Quadrini [16] develop a monetary DSGE
model with the matching friction and show that it helps produce realistic Phillips curve
dynamics as well as labor-market dynamics.
The main purpose of this paper is to reevaluate the model's quantitative performance.
I show that the model encounters serious problems in its vacancy dynamics and that the
problems in vacancy behavior cause counterfactual dynamic behavior of gross °ows as well.
These problems result from one of the key equilibrium conditions in this class of models:
the free-entry condition into the matching market. Although this condition is widely used
in the literature, none of the papers has paid much attention to the implications of the
condition. The free-entry condition states that ¯rms can immediately enter the matching
market by simply posting vacancies when doing so is expected to yield positive returns. In
equilibrium, the expected returns to posting a vacancy are equalized to a vacancy posting
cost. Suppose that a negative aggregate productivity shock hits the economy. The negative
shock decreases the expected returns from posting a vacancy, and therefore, the number of
vacancies initially drops. However, the incentive to post vacancies quickly rises as the adverse
shock increases unemployment, since this raises the chance that the ¯rm will successfully
¯nd a worker from the pool of unemployed. The \echo e®ect" caused by the increases in
unemployment has several important implications for the model's cyclical properties. A
direct implication is that vacancies in the model are not persistent even if one assumes a
1highly persistent aggregate productivity shock, such as the one used in the real business
cycle literature; the adverse e®ect of the low aggregate productivity on ¯rms' hiring e®ort is
mitigated by the higher probability of ¯nding a worker. Second, the recovery of vacancies
puts upward pressures on the number of matches. Higher unemployment during a recession
directly contributes to increasing the number of matches, and this increase is enhanced by
the recovery in vacancies. Finally, the surge in ¯rms' hiring motivation, in turn, pushes up
the job ¯nding rate for unemployed workers. This promotes separations of matched pairs as
it is relatively easy for separated workers to ¯nd subsequent employment opportunities.1
To test these predictions, I provide stylized facts about cyclical properties of job vacancies
and gross worker °ows by estimating trivariate vector autoregressions (VARs).2 An \aggre-
gate shock" is identi¯ed by using Uhlig's [38] agnostic Bayesian method that imposes only the
least controversial inequality constraints on the patterns of impulse responses. Speci¯cally,
I impose only minimal and sensible restrictions on the responses of gross worker °ows and
employment growth and no restrictions on the behavior of vacancies.3 One of the advantages
of this approach over the conventional exact-identi¯cation scheme is that the method allows
one to ¯nd all possible responses that satisfy the sign restrictions and thus gives us a better
sense about robustness of the empirical ¯ndings.
The main ¯ndings are as follows. While the VAR exercises show that the empirical
responses of vacancies clearly exhibit a hump-shaped pattern, the model fails to produce
this pattern. Further, even though the model matches qualitative patterns of responses of
gross °ows, the model's responses greatly exaggerate their empirical analogues. When a
recessionary shock arrives, it is the case both in the model and the data that, after an initial
decline, the creation rate surges to a level higher than the pre-shock level owing to higher
unemployment. However, the extent of the increases in the creation rate is much greater
in the model. This is because vacancies bounce back quickly in the model, while they are
persistently low in the data. Further, although the model and the data both predict a
persistently high separation rate after the recessionary shock, the model's response is \too
persistent" compared to the empirical responses. Again, the lack of persistence in vacancies
is the source of this behavior as I described above.
1Cooley and Quadrini's [16] results show that the productivity shock and monetary shock produce virtu-
ally the same responses of job °ows and vacancies. Thus, the description in this paragraph appears to apply
to the responses to the monetary shock as well.
2Note that the behavior of stock of employment is implied by gross °ows.
3Notice the contrast with the identifying assumption used in an in°uential paper by Blanchard and
Diamond [4]. To identify the aggregate shock, they assume that vacancies decline for nine months following
a negative aggregate shock. This is, however, not necessarily consistent with the model's prediction.
2Another important symptom of the model's problems with vacancy dynamics is that
correlation patterns between unemployment and vacancies are at odds with empirical evi-
dence. The U.S. data show that cyclical components of these series are strongly negatively
correlated not only contemporaneously but also at leads and lags. This relationship may be
referred to as the dynamic Beveridge curve. It is not surprising, however, that the model
fails to generate an empirically plausible dynamic Beveridge curve because of the counter-
factual behavior of vacancies. In particular, the model predicts that vacancies are positively
correlated with lagged unemployment.
A recent paper by Shimer [36] considers a version of the matching model that does not al-
low for endogenous separations, in contrast to the model considered here. He shows that his
model produces a strong contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and vacan-
cies but fails to generate su±cient volatility of unemployment and vacancies for reasonable
productivity shocks. The trivariate VAR estimates reported below, however, reveal that
the separation rate responds sharply and persistently to aggregate shocks. This raises the
question of whether Shimer's ¯ndings depend on his counterfactual assumption of a constant
separation rate. As shown by den Haan et al. [19], endogenizing the separation rate improves
the model's ability to magnify and propagate underlying shocks. Owing to shifts in the sepa-
ration margin, realistic unemployment responses can be generated using the standard process
of productivity shocks. Thus, insu±cient magni¯cation of shocks is not an issue under the
more realistic speci¯cation of the matching model. With endogenous separations, however,
the stronger echo e®ect on the vacancy posting decision greatly reduces vacancy persistence,
leading to a much lower negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
To enhance my claim, I also replicate Shimer's results by ¯xing the separation rate, and I
show that the model implies insu±cient vacancy persistence even under this speci¯cation. In
particular, even though one can indeed obtain a strong negative contemporaneous correlation
between unemployment and vacancies, the model lacks the ability to generate a hump-
shaped and persistent response of vacancies and, consequently, is unable to produce plausible
unemployment-vacancy dynamics.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 ¯rst overviews the general ideas about the
agnostic identi¯cation scheme and then applies the method to worker °ows and job vacancies,
thus providing grounds for evaluating the quantitative performance of the model.4 Section
3 lays out the discrete time version of the standard Mortensen and Pissarides [28] labor-
matching model and calibrates it. This section also presents the calibration for the model
4Note that the responses of worker °ows imply the response of employment.
3that assumes the ¯xed separation rate. Section 4 shows that the model's cyclical properties
are not supported by the empirical evidence given in Section 2 in either version of the model.
Section 5 summarizes the results and o®ers some possible remedies for the model.
2 Empirical Evidence
This section presents the stylized facts about dynamic behavior of gross worker °ows and
job vacancies in the U.S. Before presenting the results, I ¯rst give an overview of the general
ideas about the agnostic identi¯cation scheme proposed by Uhlig [38].5 The key elements of
this approach are to impose only the least controversial qualitative (or sign) restrictions on
patterns of impulse responses and to uncover all possible responses that are consistent with
those restrictions. Following Uhlig, uncertainty about the estimated parameters is taken
into account in a Bayesian manner.6
2.1 Identi¯cation Scheme and Its Mechanics
Let Yt be a vector of n endogenous variables containing time-t values whose dynamic rela-
tionships are described by the following vector autoregression of order p (VAR(p)):
©(L)Yt = ºt; (1)
where ºt is an n £ 1 vector containing time-t values of reduced-form disturbances whose
variance-covariance matrix is written as Eºtº0
t = §, and ©(L) = I¡©1L¡©2L2¡¢¢¢¡©pLp.
Assuming that ©(L) is invertible, the VAR(p) has a Wold moving-average representation,
Yt = ª(L)ºt; (2)
where ª(L) = ©(L)¡1 = §1
j=0ªjLj. Let !t be an n £ 1 vector containing time-t values of
structural disturbances. The reduced-form residuals and structural disturbances are linked
through
ºt = A!t; (3)
where it is assumed that the structural disturbances are mutually independent as is standard
in the literature. Also, I adopt the normalization that E!t!0
t = I. Using Equation (3) in
Equation (2) implies that
Yt = ª(L)A!t:
5Faust [20] also adopts a similar identi¯cation scheme.
6Much of the presentation below follows Burnside[9].
4Thus, ªj can be constructed from ©j, which can be estimated by ordinary least squares,
and knowledge about A allows one to fully characterize the process of Yt in terms of the
structural disturbances !t. The variance-covariance structure of the reduced-form residuals
puts constraints on the matrix A:
AA
0 = §; (4)
where least squares give us a mean estimate of §. The identi¯cation problem is therefore to
uncover the
n(n¡1)
2 free elements in A by imposing identifying restrictions.
An important result in Uhlig's[38] paper is that the matrix A can always be written as
A = X¤
1=2Q; (5)
where X is an orthogonal matrix whose columns are the orthonormal eigenvectors of §,
¤ denotes a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of § on its principal diagonal, and Q
denotes some orthogonal matrix (i.e., QQ0 = I). Equation (5) shows that determining the
free elements in A can be conveniently transformed into the problem of choosing elements
in an orthonormal set. Furthermore, if one is interested only in responses to one particular
shock, say, an aggregate shock, then the problem amounts to determining an orthonormal
vector q in the following expression:
a = X¤
1=2q; (6)
where a is a column of A (which Uhlig calls an impulse vector) containing the contempora-
neous responses of n endogenous variables to the structural shock of our interest, and q is a
column of Q in the corresponding location. The main idea of the identi¯cation scheme is to
impose a set of inequality constraints on ªja. This, of course, does not uniquely identify a
but gives us ranges of possible responses consistent with the inequality constraints.
The ranges can be easily computed numerically. For each ¯xed set of the reduced-
form VAR coe±cients © = [©0
1;©0
2;¢ ¢ ¢;©0
p] and the error variance-covariance matrix §,
I draw candidate vectors q from a unit sphere and keep only the draws that satisfy the
sign restrictions. Following Uhlig, I deal with the sampling uncertainty about the VAR
parameters in a Bayesian manner. The parameters © and § are jointly drawn from a
Normal-Wishart posterior distribution.7 In my application, I examine 400 equally spaced
q's on a unit sphere for each set of the VAR parameters (©, §) and keep the draws that
satisfy the sign restrictions. I draw the posterior 100 times, and therefore, a total of 40;000
q's are examined.
7See Appendix B of Uhlig for the collection of formulas used for my estimation and inferences. Also, I
use uninformative priors following Uhlig.
52.2 Sign Restrictions
Now, speci¯cally, let Yt = [cret;dest;vt]0 be a vector of the creation rate, the separation rate,
and vacancies. Because the creation rate and the separation rate are de¯ned as the number
of matches created and destroyed normalized by the number of employed, the di®erence
between the two gives the growth rate of employment, namely:
cret ¡ dest = ¢et; (7)
where ¢et denotes the growth rate of employment in period t. Since the main focus of this
paper is to examine the behavior of vacancies in response to an aggregate shock, I impose
restrictions only on the responses of gross °ows and employment growth and no restrictions
on the response of vacancies.
The benchmark identi¯cation imposes the following three sign restrictions:8
1. Employment growth is not positive for at least K periods following a negative aggregate
shock.
2. The negative shock leads to a non-negative response in the separation rate in the
impact period.
3. The negative shock leads to a non-positive response in the creation rate in the impact
period.
There seems to be no room to debate over the validity of the ¯rst restriction except for
the choice of K. The benchmark case sets K at four quarters. To ensure robustness of the
results, I also try the choice of K = 2. The second and third restrictions are taken from Davis
and Haltiwanger[17]. According to them, these two restrictions are consistent with a wide
range of theoretical models and alternative views about business cycles and, therefore, would
be widely accepted. As we will see later, the calibrated labor-matching model satis¯es these
restrictions. Note that these two restrictions imply that employment growth is not positive
in the impact period.
However, a potential problem with the third restriction is that the creation rate could
possibly increase in the impact period of a negative shock. Suppose that a negative shock
induces a spike in the separation rate, inducing large °ows into the unemployment pool.
8I write the restrictions in terms of the responses to a negative aggregate shock for convenience of
discussion. The restrictions on the responses to a positive shock can be written symmetrically.
6Then the increase in job seekers would have positive impacts on the number of matches.9
Although a recessionary shock is likely to depress ¯rms' hiring e®ort, causing a negative
e®ect on job creation, we do not know ex ante which e®ect dominates. Therefore, imposing
the third restriction puts us at risk of eliminating dynamics possibly driven by aggregate
shocks. This concern is larger especially if workers' job ¯nding rate is so high that a spike
in the separation rate may be immediately followed by increases in the creation rate. It is
then possible that the separation rate and the creation rate are both observed to increase in
the initial period of the negative shock. To deal with this concern, I also consider the case
in which the third restriction is dropped. Note that although dropping the third restriction
allows the creation rate to increase in the impact period, the ¯rst and second restrictions
imply that the increase in the separation rate in the impact period must be larger than that
in the creation rate, so that employment growth is negative in the impact period.
Notice that the sign restrictions above are much less restrictive than the conventional
exact-identi¯cation scheme, which typically takes the form of either short-run zero restric-
tions or long-run zero restrictions (e.g., Blanchard and Quah[6] and Shapiro and Wat-
son[35]). In particular, the exact-identi¯cation scheme generally requires restrictions on
the e®ects of the shocks that we are not interested in. In our case, restrictions about the ef-
fects of other shocks such as an \allocative" shock would be additionally required to uncover
the e®ects of the aggregate shock. This can be seen from Equation (4) where elements in
one column are related (non-linearly) with elements in other columns. Although Davis and
Haltiwanger[17] provide several \reasonable" long-run restrictions on the e®ects of an aggre-
gate shock and allocative shock, none of them are comparable to the qualitative restrictions
used here in terms of simplicity and plausibility.
2.3 Data
The VAR, Equation (1), is estimated by using the Conference Board's help-wanted index
and CPS worker °ow data. The former series is an index of counts of help-wanted adver-
tisements in 51 major newspapers in the U.S. There are several pieces of evidence that this
series closely tracks actual job vacancies in the U.S.10 It is well known that CPS worker
°ows are subject to several serious statistical biases. There have been several attempts to
9Recall that the creation rate is de¯ned as the number of matches formed normalized by the level of
employment. The decreases in employment thus also contribute to raising the creation rate.
10See Shimer [36] for this point. The BLS recently started a comprehensive survey on job vacancies (Job
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey; JOLTS). Shimer compares the help-wanted index with this series over
the recent three-year period after 2000:Q4 and ¯nds that they move very closely with each other.
7correct these biases (e.g., Abowd and Zellner[1] and Poterba and Summers[33]). Bleakley
et al.[7] have recently updated the Abowd-Zellner adjusted series and made the quarterly
series publicly available.11 The data set includes °ows among the three states: employment
(E), unemployment (U), and not in the the labor force (N). In the following estimation re-
sults, I use total °ows into employment (from the unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force
states) normalized by employment for the creation rate, and total °ows out of employment
(to the unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force states) normalized by employment for the
separation rate. Alternative measures can be constructed by focusing on the °ows between
unemployment (U) and employment (E). The results below are, however, robust with respect
to using the alternative measures for creation and separation.
The sample period is restricted to 1967:Q3¡1999:Q1 owing to the availability of the
worker °ow data. The order of the VAR is set to 3 suggested by the BIC. The results,
however, are not sensitive to the choice of lag length. No deterministic components except
constant terms are included in the estimation. The ADF tests reject the null of a unit root
at a 15% signi¯cance level for all the series.
2.4 Results
Figure 1 presents the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation negative aggregate shock
when all three restrictions are imposed and K is set to 4. The responses of the creation rate
and separation rate (and thus implied employment growth and the level of employment)
exhibit patterns that are qualitatively consistent with the ¯nding in the existing literature
that stresses the role of job destruction in propagating shocks (e.g., Ramey and Watson [34],
den Haan et al. [19], Gomes et al. [23]); the creation rate recovers quickly after the initial
decline contributing to increasing employment, whereas the separation rate remains higher
than its steady-state level for about 2¡3 years after the shock. Note also that the empirical
¯nding that the aggregate shock has a long-lasting e®ect on the separation rate suggests the
rejection of the model that assumes the ¯xed separation rate. Figures 2 through 4 present
the results for the cases in which K is set to 2 and/or the restriction on the initial response of
the creation rate is lifted. The results are virtually unchanged. As I will show later, although
the overall patterns of the empirical responses of gross °ows are qualitatively consistent with
the model responses, the model responses greatly exaggerate these patterns.
Consider now the responses of vacancies. The lower left panels of these ¯gures show that
11The data set is available through http://weber.ucsd.edu/~bleakley/eun°ows.txt. Although original CPS
data are collected at monthly frequency, only the quarterly data are available on the web page.
8vacancies clearly exhibit hump-shaped patterns. Although this may not be a surprising result
intuitively, the model's prediction is not consistent with the results as we will see shortly.
Note, however, that given that the bounds are computed by ordering the responses in each
period, it is possible that these hump-shaped responses are generated by the combinations of
responses that are not hump shaped individually. To meet this concern, I will later examine
the responses individually.
2.5 How Much Variation Do Aggregate Shocks Explain?
Given that the main interest of this paper is to evaluate the model's ability to replicate the
empirical impulse responses to an aggregate shock, it is important to make sure that the
aggregate shocks account for signi¯cant variations in the variables of interest. There has
been a long discussion in the literature addressing the question of how much of employment
°uctuations can be attributed to aggregate shocks. A number of papers have tried to answer
this question by using a wide variety of identifying assumptions in the VAR framework.
The results are quite mixed and strongly depend on their identifying assumptions (e.g.,
Davis and Haltiwanger [17] and Campbell and Kuttner [11]). The sign-restrictions approach
seems to have advantages over the conventional exact-identi¯cation scheme for addressing
this issue because the restrictions imposed in this paper are simple and there appears to
be little room to debate over the plausibility of the restrictions. The upper panel of Figure
5 displays the result obtained by imposing the three sign restrictions, and K is set to 4.
According to the median estimates, the data indicate that the shock accounts for about 60%
of employment growth for all forecast horizons. Compared to the results in the previous
studies, this estimate appears to be on the high side. Furthermore, the 80% error bands are
quite narrow, given the nature of this type of exercise.
The lower panel of the ¯gure present the results for vacancies. In this case, the median
estimate is around 40%, and the 80% band covers a wide range that includes the values
close to zero. However, this result may be due to the lack of restrictions on the behavior
of vacancies, and thus the valid draws actually include uninteresting cases that a negative
shock yields increases in vacancies. Figures 1 through 4 indicate that the 80% bands of the
responses cover such cases. To eliminate such dynamics in vacancies, I impose an additional
sign restriction that forces vacancies not to increase in the impact period. Figure 6 presents
the result. Although the lower band is still less than 10%, the median estimate has risen
substantially to 60%.
93 The Mortensen and Pissarides Model
This section lays out a discrete time version of the Mortensen and Pissarides [28] model.12
There is a continuum of identical workers with total mass equal to one in this economy,
along with a continuum of potential ¯rms, potentially having an in¯nite mass. Further, each
¯rm consists of only one job to which only one worker is attached. Workers are assumed
to be risk neutral, with discount factor ¯ lying between zero and one. Time spent working
is restricted to be either zero or one, meaning that workers provide one unit of labor when
employed and zero when unemployed. Labor is the only input for production.13 To hire a
worker, a ¯rm ¯rst must open a vacancy that imposes a cost c per period. Other important
assumptions are that workers search for their jobs only when unemployed and that workers'
decision about labor-force participation is ignored.
3.1 Employment Relationship
Each worker-¯rm pair that engages in production produces output according to the produc-
tion technology:
zityt;
where zit is a random productivity shock that is speci¯c to ith pair in period t and yt
indicates a random aggregate productivity shock in period t, which follows a ¯rst order
Markov process. The idiosyncratic productivity shock is assumed to be i.i.d. across jobs and
time.14 The distribution of zit is described by a cumulative distribution function H(zit) whose
support is assumed to be [0;1). Worker-¯rm pairs can be destroyed for either exogenous or
endogenous reasons, as in den Haan et al.[19]; matched pairs are exogenously destroyed with
constant probability ½x per period, and those that do not experience exogenous separation
may choose to separate endogenously.
12Although there are some variations in my particular version of the model from the original Mortensen
and Pissarides model (for example, they formulate the model in continuous time), these di®erences should
not alter the conclusion of this paper.
13Andolfatto[2], Merz[26] and den Haan et al.[19] embed the job-matching friction into dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models with capital and a risk-averse household. Since these models with capital en-
counter the same problems addressed in this paper, I focus on the problems by ignoring capital. In principle,
adding capital should not alter the conclusions.
14den Haan et al. [19] (p. 495) examine the robustness of their propagation results with respect to the
presence of persistence in idiosyncratic productivity and conclude that their results do not depend on the
assumption that idiosyncratic productivity follows an i.i.d. process.
10The worker who is separated from a job, whether exogenously or endogenously, obtains
b+Ut, where b is the current-period unemployment bene¯t, and Ut denotes the continuation
value of the unemployed worker net of the current-period unemployment bene¯t.15
Given the outside options for the worker and ¯rm, the separation decision of the matched
pair can be described as follows. Let Gt denote the joint continuation value of the worker-
¯rm pair in period t. The surplus of the matched pair over the outside options in period t
is then written as:
Sit = zityt + Gt ¡ (Ut + b): (8)
The worker and ¯rm bargain over this joint surplus. The negotiation is resolved according
to the Nash bargaining solution, where the ¯rm and the worker take a ¯xed proportion of
Sit, ¼ and 1¡¼, respectively. Since the current-period return becomes lower as zit declines,
there exists a level ^ zit such that Sit < 0 for zit < ^ zit, where both parties agree to abandon
their relationship, while Sit ¸ 0 for zit ¸ ^ zit; where both parties agree to maintain their
relationship and engage in production in this period. The level of ^ zit is referred to as the





The overall separation rate is given by ½x + (1 ¡ ½x)½it.
3.2 Matching Market
Unemployed workers and ¯rms with vacant jobs engage in search activity in a matching
market, which is characterized by a constant-returns-to-scale aggregate matching function:16
mt = m(ut;vt); (9)
where mt denotes the number of matches formed in the period-t matching market, ut denotes
unemployment, and vt denotes vacancies. The matching function m(:) is increasing in both






15The symbol b is referred to as \unemployment bene¯t" simply for convenience, even though it is not a
transfer from the government. More precisely, b should be considered as home production or utility from
leisure that unemployed workers enjoy. The ¯rm's outside option alternative to production is zero in the
benchmark model, as we will see shortly.
16This assumption is supported by numerous empirical studies. Previous work for the U.S. includes
Blanchard and Diamond[4] and Bleakley and Fuhrer[8]. See Petrongolo and Pissarides[29] for an extensive
survey on this issue.














A major advantage of this functional form over the widely used Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation
is that the matching probabilities de¯ned in Equations (10) and (11) take on values between
zero and one for all ut 2 [0;1] and vt 2 [0;1).
3.3 Equilibrium
Consider now the situation facing a ¯rm and a worker in the matching market. When the




the pair draws the idiosyncratic productivity shock from the distribution H at the beginning
of period t + 1 and decides whether to start producing or not. The pair faces exactly the
same decision problem as that of the ongoing ¯rm-worker pairs, whose decision problem is
described in Subsection 3.1. The newly formed pair is also subject to the exogenous and
endogenous separation, and if it survives the separation process, production takes place.
When the pair decides to produce, the ¯rm and worker share the surplus over their outside
options by a ¯xed proportion as before.
The ¯rm's outside option, which is the value of having a vacant job, is zero in every
period as a consequence of free entry into the matching market. The free-entry condition is
written as:17
0 = ¡c + ¯¸
f





The condition states that, in equilibrium, the vacancy posting cost equals the expected
returns from posting a vacancy.
On the other hand, the worker ¯nds a ¯rm with probability ¸w
t , and if he accepts the
relationship, he obtains the share 1 ¡ ¼ of surplus St+1 in addition to his outside option
Ut+1 + b. When he does not meet with a ¯rm, or the relationship is rejected after the










St+1dH(zt+1) + Ut+1 + b
¸
: (14)
17In what follows, the i subscripts are suppressed because the idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed
to be independent across time and worker-¯rm pairs.
12Next, consider the joint returns of a worker-¯rm pair that produces in period t. Given
that the ¯rm's outside option is zero, the joint outside option for the relationship equals
Ut+1 +b. If the relationship survives the separation process at the beginning of period t+1,







St+1dH(zt+1) + Ut+1 + b
¸
: (15)
Finally, unemployment evolves according to:
ut = ut¡1 + [½
x + (1 ¡ ½
x)½t](1 ¡ ut¡1) ¡ (1 ¡ ½
x)(1 ¡ ½t)m(ut¡1;vt¡1); (16)
where the second and third terms on the right-hand side are the °ows into and from the
unemployment pool, respectively.
The period-t aggregate state variables of the economy consist of aggregate productivity
and the number of unemployed at the beginning of period t, ut¡1 ¡ mt¡1. Letting st =
fyt;ut¡1 ¡mt¡1g be a set of the period-t aggregate state variables, the recursive equilibrium
is de¯ned by a list of functions, G(st);U(st);v(st) and ^ z(st), such that (i) equations for
continuation values for a vacant job (13), an unemployed worker (14), and a operating job
(15) hold; (ii) the separation margin ^ z(st) is determined by ^ ztyt +G(st)¡U(st)¡b = 0; and
(iii) these conditions are satis¯ed under the evolution of aggregate productivity yt (speci¯ed
below), and unemployment (Equation (16)).18
3.4 Calibrating the Model
This section describes the model calibrations. I ¯rst calibrate the model just laid out, which
features the endogenous separation decision. I also present the calibration for the speci¯ca-
tion that assumes the ¯xed separation rate. This latter speci¯cation can be calibrated as a
special case of the former. Although the latter speci¯cation is not supported by the data as
shown in Subsection 2.4, examining the performance of the latter model serves to clarify the
fundamental nature of the problems of the model.
I assume the following aggregate productivity process for both speci¯cations:
lnyt+1 = » lnyt + "t+1; (17)
where "t is taken to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal with zero
mean and standard deviation ¾". This process for aggregate productivity is commonly used in
18See the appendix for the solution algorithm.
13the RBC literature. Following the literature, I set » and ¾" at 0.95 and 0.007, respectively.
I also assume for both speci¯cations that the discount factor ¯ is 0:99, which implies an
annual interest rate of 4 percent, and that the bargaining parameter for ¯rms ¼ is 0.5, as is
standard in the literature.
3.4.1 Benchmark Speci¯cation
I start with the steady-state version of the law of motion for unemployment (Equation (16)):
[½
x + (1 ¡ ½
x)½](1 ¡ u) = (1 ¡ ½
x)(1 ¡ ½)¸
wu: (18)
To calibrate the above equation, I make use of the empirical evidence on the worker match-
ing probability and the overall separation rate ½ + (1 ¡ ½x)½. The implied unemployment
rate in the model economy is then computed. I refer to CPS worker °ow data to pin down
the overall separation rate. Using Bleakley et al.'s [7] data set, I ¯nd the quarterly sepa-
ration rate from employment at around 0:10 over the available sample period. The worker
matching probability is determined from the unemployment duration estimated by Clark
and Summers [13]. They show that the measured unemployment duration is substantially
downward biased because of reporting errors induced by the presence of the out-of-the-labor-
force state. As also discussed by Cole and Rogerson [14], the main issue is that measured
unemployment durations do not capture the expected time between employment spells but
rather the expected time before leaving the unemployment state to either the employment
state or the out-of-the-labor-force state, which is problematic in the face of the fact that there
is a large °ow out of the labor force into employment every period.19 Given that the model
abstracts from the out-of-the-labor-force state, it appears appropriate to treat the expected
time between employment spells as the \unemployment" duration in the model economy.20
Clark and Summers estimate average unemployment duration at 19.9 weeks in 1974, which
is translated into the matching probability of 0:65 per quarter. Taking ½ + (1 ¡ ½x) = 0:1
and ¸w = 0:65 as given, we can compute the implied unemployment rate at 0:146. This is
obviously much higher than the measured unemployment rate in the U.S. whose historical
average is around 6 percent. The higher implied unemployment rate here simply re°ects
that I measure unemployment duration as the expected time between employment spells,
including those who are looking for a job being out of the labor force. In fact, referring to
19As Bleakley et al.'s [7] data set indicates, the °ows between N and E are roughly of the same magnitude
as those between U and E. See also Blanchard and Diamond [5].
20Note that the correction is essentially equivalent to treating as \unemployed" those who are identi¯ed
as being out of the labor force but who \want a job," as well as those who are o±cially unemployed.
14Blanchard and Diamond [5], den Haan et al.[19] identify 11.2 million job seekers and 93:2





Using this unemployment rate together with either ½ + (1 ¡ ½x) = 0:1 or ¸w = 0:65 gives
two other sets of estimates that are consistent with Equation (18). My results are based on
the ¯rst set of estimates. But the results presented below are insensitive with respect to the
choice of the other two sets of estimates.
To break down the overall separation rate into exogenous and endogenous parts, I adopt
the interpretation that the model's endogenous separation rate corresponds to the permanent
layo® rate.21 Valletta [39] calculates the share of permanent layo®s out of the total incidence
of separation over the period 1976¡1998 and shows that it °uctuates around 25 percent. This
evidence allows me to set ½ at 0:025.22 Using ½ = 0:025 together with the total separation
of 0:1, the exogenous separation rate is set equal to 0:083.
Next, the steady-state matching probability for ¯rms ¸f is set equal to the same value
as the worker matching probability 0:65. This choice is made simply because the equal
matching probabilities imply the equal steady-state elasticities of the number of matches
with respect to unemployment and vacancies, i.e., 0:5, under den Haan et al.'s[19] matching
function used in this paper (Equation (12)).23 I could alternatively refer to den Haan et
al.'s [19] estimate of the ¯rm matching probability equal to 0:71. The numerical results
below are again robust to this alternative choice.
The parameters l, b, and c are uniquely determined by requiring the steady-state version
of the model to match the empirical measures of the unemployment rate, the separation rate,
and the matching probabilities obtained above. Finally, the idiosyncratic productivity shock
is assumed to be i.i.d. lognormal with mean zero and standard deviation ¾z, following den
Haan et al.[19]. Finally, ¾z is selected so that the model matches the observed variability of
the separation rate.
21This interpretation for the endogenous separation rate can be found in den Haan et al. [19] and Collard
et al. [15].
22Topel [37] calculates the quarterly permanent layo® rate at 0:018 based on the PSID in 1985. This is
broadly in line with the the value used here.
23den Haan et al.'s matching function implies variable elasticities in contrast to the widely used Cobb-
Douglas speci¯cation. This is a natural consequence of the matching probabilities being bounded between
zero and one for all ut 2 [0;1] and vt 2 [0;1) as I mentioned before.
153.4.2 Fixed-Separation-Rate Speci¯cation
The benchmark model is modi¯ed by letting the endogenous separation rate be zero. Ac-
cordingly, idiosyncratic uncertainty is eliminated by setting zt = 1 and ¾z = 0. Under this
speci¯cation, the steady-state version of the evolution of unemployment reduces to:
½
x(1 ¡ u) = (1 ¡ ½
x)¸
wu: (19)
As in the benchmark speci¯cation, the total separation rate and the worker matching prob-
abilities are set equal to 0:1 and 0:65, respectively, implying that the steady-state unem-
ployment rate is 0:146 as in the benchmark case. The worker matching probability and the
unemployment rate deviate from Shimer's [36] calibration, which sets the steady-state worker
matching probability at 0:34 per month and the steady-state unemployment rate at 0.057.
These di®erences are due to the fact that Shimer takes reported unemployment as the em-
pirical analogue to unemployment in his model, and accordingly, the matching probability is
computed from the unemployment duration data. On the other hand, I lump together those
who are still looking for jobs being out of the labor force and those o±cially unemployed and
compute the matching probability from the evidence on non-employment duration. How-
ever, these di®erences did not have signi¯cant impacts on the model's quantitative properties.
In other words, Shimer's results are well approximated under my calibration despite these
di®erences.
The steady-state matching probability for ¯rms ¸f and the parameter l for the matching
function are set to the same values as in the benchmark speci¯cation.
The unemployment bene¯t b is chosen to be 0:4, following Shimer. This value corresponds
to the upper end of the range of income replacement rates in the U.S. This parameter plays
a crucial role in determining the model's ability to magnify aggregate productivity shocks,
as shown analytically by Shimer. To see this point intuitively in my framework, ¯rst note
that surplus St gets smaller as b gets larger, and thus an aggregate shock has a larger impact
on the surplus in a percentage term. Vacancies then must change by more in a percentage
term in order to ensure that the free-entry condition holds (see Equation (13)). The larger
volatility in vacancies also makes unemployment more volatile as unemployment evolves
according to Equation (16). Note that in the benchmark speci¯cation where the separation
decision is endogenous, the parameter b must be assigned to achieve the target level of the
endogenous separation rate, which yields a much higher level of the outside option b = 0:87
than Shimer's choice. This implies that the benchmark model exhibits larger volatilities
even apart from endogenous °uctuations in the separation rate. The next section shows that
16the \leverage e®ect" together with endogenous °uctuations in the separation rate makes it
possible for the benchmark model to perform well along the volatility dimensions whereas the
low value of b and the ¯xed separation rate lead to a serious problem along these dimensions.
Rather than exploring the issue of which speci¯cation is more reasonable, I will show that
the model encounters basically the same problems in its vacancy dynamics no matter which
speci¯cation is used.
4 Performance of the Model
4.1 Benchmark Speci¯cation
Figure 7 presents the model's impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation negative aggre-
gate shock. The upper right panel shows that vacancies respond to shocks immediately; the
negative shock lowers ¯rms' expected returns, and thereby vacancies, eventually raising the
matching probability up to the point where the free-entry condition is restored. However,
the initial e®ects largely disappear in a couple of quarters. From then on, vacancies slowly
converge back to the steady-state level. The behavior after the initial decline is due to the
echo e®ect; as unemployment rises, the matching probability for the ¯rm becomes higher,
eliminating ¯rms' incentive to keep cutting vacancies any further. Another important feature
of the model's responses, as illustrated in the lower left panel of the ¯gure, is that the initial
decline in vacancies produces the lower creation rate, but immediately after the decline, the
creation rate surges to a much higher level than the pre-shock level, re°ecting the strong
in°uence of unemployment.
Figure 8 compares the model and empirical responses. First, observe in the lower right
panel that the model has no trouble in generating a volatility in employment (equivalently
unemployment) that is comparable to the data (actually the model generates too much
volatility). Next, consider the patterns of responses of gross °ows behind the employment
stock. As mentioned above, the model's responses greatly exaggerate the empirical responses;
increases in the creation rate are too large, and the separation rate is too persistent. Finally,
the lower left panel compares the responses of vacancies. As we saw in Section 2, the observed
data strongly favor a hump-shaped and persistent response. Neither of these can be observed
in the model. This problematic behavior of vacancy is the source of the overshooting behavior
in gross °ows. Clearly, the immediate recovery of vacancies, due to the echo e®ect discussed
above, pushes up the creation rate to a higher level than otherwise. Moreover, it also makes
the separation rate too persistent because the surge in vacancies causes the worker matching
17probability to be higher than otherwise. Unemployed workers then ¯nd it easier to ¯nd next
employment opportunities and thus, in turn, have larger incentives to separate. Observe
also that the initial declines in vacancies in the model and the data are roughly of the same
magnitude. This indicates that lack of volatility of vacancies is not a ¯rst-order issue under
the benchmark speci¯cation. The more fundamental problem lies in the model's inability to
produce a hump-shaped and persistent response in vacancies.
Another symptom of the model due to the behavior of vacancies is its inability to generate
an empirically plausible Beveridge curve. The middle row (labelled \Benchmark") of Table
3 presents the cross correlations between unemployment and vacancies in the model.24 The
model generates only a small negative correlation between the two, whereas the observed
data display a correlation coe±cient of ¡0:95. Observe also that in the model, increases
in unemployment predict future recovery of vacancies, and this relationship shows up as
positive correlations between period-t unemployment and future vacancies. In the observed
data, however, we do not observe this pattern. The data display strong negative correlations
at all leads and lags with some indication that vacancies lead unemployment.
4.2 Fixed-Separation-Rate Speci¯cation
Figure 9 displays impulse responses of the model economy where the separation rate is ¯xed.
An important observation here is that the echo e®ect in vacancies is still present in the model
but weaker than in the preceding case; vacancies recover only half way initially and then
slowly converge to the steady-state level. In the benchmark case, on the other hand, almost
all the initial response is corrected within a few quarters. This weaker echo e®ect is explained
by the fact that unemployment volatility is much smaller under this alternative speci¯cation
because of the lower outside option and the ¯xed separation rate. Figure 10 puts together
the model and empirical responses under the alternative speci¯cation and clearly illustrates
Shimer's [36] point that the model generates only small variabilities relative to the data.
As discussed in Subsection 3.4.2, this volatility issue arises because of the choices that the
separation rate is ¯xed and the outside option for the matched pair is set low.
The less substantial echo e®ect makes it easier for the model to generate negative cor-
relations between unemployment and vacancies, which we can see in the last row of Table
24The statistics of the model economies are based on 100 simulated samples, each of which consists of 327
periods, where only the last 127 observations are used to compute the statistics. The number of observations
corresponds to the available sample period of CPS worker °ow data. The ¯rst 200 observations are ignored
to randomize initial conditions. The data are logged and HP ¯ltered with the smoothing parameter 1600.
183. Note that given the timing of the model, unemployment responds to the shock only in
the next period under the ¯xed-separation-rate speci¯cation. It is therefore appropriate to
compare the correlation between period-t unemployment and one-period-lagged vacancies
with the contemporaneous correlation in the observed data. As expected, current-period un-
employment is highly negatively correlated with one-period-lagged vacancies in the model.
This result corresponds to Shimer's simulation result.25 However, even though the model
is able to generate the strong negative correlation under this alternative speci¯cation, the
correlation patterns of the model still substantially di®er from the observed pattern. Impor-
tantly, the echo e®ect is still present, though weaker, making it impossible for the model to
generate a hump-shaped response, which is found to be a robust feature of the data.
4.3 Looking at Individual Responses
I have argued so far that the model has a serious problem in its vacancy dynamics, by
visually comparing the model and empirical responses; the lower left panels of Figures 8 and
10 clearly indicated that the median empirical responses of vacancies are of quite di®erent
shape from the model responses. Recall, however, that the bounds are computed for each
period rather than for the entire functions. Given that the model responses are actually
within the bands almost all the time, it is important to examine the individual responses.
To con¯rm that my claim is valid, I calculate the fraction of the responses that roughly
match the model's predictions about the vacancy behavior to the total number of responses
that satisfy the sign restrictions. Speci¯cally, I select the responses that meet the following























¯ for i = 1;2;3:
where !agg;t denotes an aggregate shock in period t. The ¯rst criterion indicates that vacan-
cies must drop (increase) in the impact period of the negative (positive) aggregate shock.
The second criterion says that the response of vacancies then approaches toward the steady-
state level in the subsequent two periods.26 Note that these criteria actually allow for a much
wider class of responses than the model responses shown in Figures 7 and 9. In particular,
these criteria do not exclude the possibility that vacancies slowly move back toward the
25Since Shimer works on a continuous time model, there is no timing issue in his model.
26The results are not sensitive with respect to setting the horizon longer.
19steady-state level following an initial drop. The idea here is to pick up the responses that
are not hump shaped and to consider them as consistent with the model. Table 4 presents
the results. Surprisingly, only 4 draws meet the above criteria out of the total of 3,149 draws
that satisfy the three sign restrictions. This exercise clearly con¯rms my claim.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the cyclical behavior of vacancies in the standard labor-matching
model is counterfactual, implying that the model's key equilibrium condition is not supported
by the observed data. Whereas the model predicts that vacancies respond to shocks with no
delay and are not persistent, the data strongly favor a hump-shaped and persistent response
of vacancies. I have also found that the problems in vacancy behavior cause gross °ows in
the model to exhibit counterfactual properties.
I propose two possible modi¯cations to the model. First, recall that in the model, rises
in unemployment produce an incentive for ¯rms to open up vacancies even though aggregate
conditions are not favorable. Notice that the statement is valid only under the assump-
tion that workers engage in search activities only when they are unemployed. That is,
countercyclical unemployment directly implies countercyclical search activities under this
assumption, thus causing a strong echo e®ect. It is then clear that anything that generates
procyclical search activities may reduce the echo e®ect caused by countercyclical unemploy-
ment. Allowing for on-the-job search could be one such candidate as the outside option
for on-the-job seekers is higher (lower) during booms (recessions).27 Barlevy [3] develops a
matching model with on-the-job search and, in fact, emphasizes the mechanism in his model
that fewer vacancies during recessions give workers a di±cult time in reallocating themselves
into better employment relationships. Although he does not explore the quantitative im-
plications for vacancy dynamics, this story appears to be in line with observed persistence
in vacancies. Mortensen [27] examines the quantitative implications of on-the-job search
extending the standard Mortensen and Pissarides [28] framework. His simulation result in
fact displays a somewhat higher negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies
27Endogenizing the labor market participation decision may also introduce procyclical search activities
into the model (e.g., in the form of a discouraged worker e®ect). In this case, however, unemployment must
be procyclical in order to eliminate the echo e®ect. Veracierto [40] shows that introducing the participation
decision into the Lucas-Prescott island model counterfactually produces procyclical unemployment. He also
argues that the result holds in the Mortensen and Pissarides labor-matching framework.
20than his earlier result with Pissarides.28 A remaining problem with this approach, however,
is that there appears to be no reason for vacancies to respond to shocks slowly, displaying a
hump-shaped pattern.
Second, it may be possible to interpret the persistent and hump-shaped response of
vacancies in the data as the evidence suggesting presence of some frictions in creating new
positions. Caballero and Hammour [10] develop a vintage model in which job creation
requires relation-speci¯c investment as well as a search cost and show that the speci¯c
investment component serves to produce a negative comovement between unemployment and
vacancies and to \decouple" the positive comovement between creation and destruction.29
Fujita and Ramey [21] examine cyclical implications of heterogeneity in a job creation process
building upon the standard Mortensen and Pissarides framework. Speci¯cally, they augment
the model by introducing costly planning for brand-new jobs and the option to mothball
preexisting jobs. These modi¯cations are shown to greatly improve the model's quantitative
performance.
6 Appendix: Solution Algorithm
This appendix presents the solution algorithm of the model. The algorithm applied here is a
non-linear global projection method. General discussions on the same class of methods can
be found in Judd[24], [25].30
Before presenting the algorithm, I ¯rst rewrite the model by following the convention
that an unprimed variable denotes its current-period value, and a primed variable denotes its
next-period value. Recall that the current-period state variables consist of s = fy;u ¡ mg.


























0) + b j y
¸
; (21)
where S(z0;s0) = z0y0+G(s0)¡U(s0)¡b and ¸w = m(u0;v(s))=u0; (ii) the free-entry condition
28Pissarides [31] and Chapter 4 of Pissarides [32] also allow for on-the-job search, but they focus on
steady-state analysis.
29They show that the model with the search cost alone predicts positive comovements between these
variables, as is consistent with the prediction of the standard labor-matching model.














where ¸f = m(u0;v(s))=v(s); (iii) the separation condition ^ zy + G(s) ¡ U(s) ¡ b = 0 de¯nes
^ z(s); (iv) these conditions are satis¯ed under the evolution of aggregate productivity and
unemployment:
lny
0 = » lny + "
0; (23)
u
0 = u + [½
x + (1 ¡ ½
x)½(^ z(s))](1 ¡ u) ¡ (1 ¡ ½
x)(1 ¡ ½(^ z(s))m: (24)
The ¯rst step in numerically solving the model is to approximate the right-hand side of
Equations (20), (21), and (22) by a tensor product of second-order Chebyshev polynomials
of each state variable. Note that each function has 33 = 27 unknown coe±cients, so there
are a total of 27 ¤ 3 = 81 unknown coe±cients. I use ¯xed-point iteration to solve for these
coe±cients. The iteration proceeds as follows; using some initial guess for the 81 unknown co-
e±cients, the current period separation margin can be computed by the separation condition,
which also gives the separation rate from ½(^ z(s)) =
R 1
^ z(s) dH(z). The integral is computed by
Simpson's rule with 15 nodes. One can then compute u0 from the evolution of unemployment




^ z(s0) S(z0;s0)dH(z0) j y
i
in
the free-entry condition (22) allows one to obtain the equilibrium level of vacancies v(s): The
matching technology then reveals the outcome of the matching market m(u0;v(s)) given the
levels of vacancies and unemployment. Given the next-period values of unemployment u0
and the distribution of the aggregate productivity shock "0, one can actually compute the
conditional expectations appearing on the right-hand side of Equations (20), (21), and (22).
The integral inside the bracket in Equation (20) is again computed by Simpson's rule with
15 nodes. The conditional expectations associated with the aggregate productivity shock
are numerically computed by Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 5 nodes. These conditional
expectations are evaluated at 27 grid points that are chosen by ¯nding three zeros of Cheby-
shev polynomials for each state variable and taking all possible combinations of the roots.
The new set of coe±cients of the approximating functions is obtained by equating the values
of the right-hand sides of Equations (20), (21), and (22) to the values of the approximating
functions at 27 grid points. Since there are 27 coe±cients in each approximating function,
this uniquely pins down the new set of coe±cients (i.e., orthogonal collocation method). The
iteration continues until convergence of the 81 Chebyshev coe±cients is achieved.
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25Table 1: Parameter Values
Symbol Concept Benchmark Exogenous
Separation
» AR(1) coe±cient of aggregate 0:950 0:950
productivity
¾" Standard deviation of the aggregate 0:007 0:007
productivity shock
b Unemployment bene¯t 0:872 0:400
¾z Standard deviation of the idiosyncratic 0:250 0:000
productivity shock
½x Exogenous separation rate 0:083 0:100
¼ Bargaining weight of the ¯rm 0:500 0:500
l Parameter in the matching function 1:609 1:609
¯ Discount factor 0:990 0:990
c Vacancy posting cost per period 0:124 0:436
Table 2: Steady-State Values
Symbol Concept Both
Calibrations
¸w Worker's matching probability 0:650
¸f Firm's matching probability 0:650
u Unemployment rate 0:156
v Vacancy rate 0:156
26Table 3: Cross Correlations Between Unemployment and Vacancies
Corr(vt+k;ut) ¡3 ¡2 ¡1 0 1 2 3
US data ¡0:60 ¡0:80 ¡0:94 ¡0:95 ¡0:81 ¡0:59 ¡0:35
(0:068) (0:054) (0:014) (0:014) (0:046) (0:058) (0:109)
Benchmark ¡0:43 ¡0:52 ¡0:51 ¡0:17 0:24 0:34 0:33
Exo. Separation ¡0:58 ¡0:77 ¡0:82 ¡0:33 ¡0:10 0:04 0:13
Notes: All series are logged and HP ¯ltered. Standard errors presented in parentheses are computed
by the den Haan and Levin's[18] GMM-VARHAC procedure. u = LHUR ¢ LHPAR=10000,
v = LHELX¢LHUR¢LHPAR=10000, where LHUR : unemployment rate, LHPAR : labor-force
participation rate, LHELX : help-wanted ads as percentage of unemployed. These data are taken
from DRI-Webstract (former CITIBASE). Sample period is 1972Q1-1993Q1.
Table 4: Probability that the Prediction of the Matching Model is Supported by the Data
number of probability sign K
valid draws (%) restrictions
3;149 0:13 1;2;3 4
7;662 0:39 1;2;3 2
3;986 0:10 1;2 4
12;431 0:51 1;2 2
Notes: The ¯rst column shows the number of valid draws (from a total of
40,000 draws) that satisfy the sign restrictions listed in the third column. The
restrictions are discussed in Subsection 2.2. The third and fourth columns give
the probability (%) that the predictions of the Mortensen and Pissarides model
regarding the behavior of vacancies are met. See page 19 for the criteria.
27Figure 1: Empirical Impulse Responses: Sign Restrictions 1, 2 and 3, K = 4









































−3 Level of Employment
quarters
Notes: The three sign restrictions are discussed in Subsection 2.2. The three lines are the 10th
percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.
28Figure 2: Empirical Impulse Responses: Sign Restrictions 1, 2 and 3, K = 2









































−3 Level of Employment
quarters
Notes: The three sign restrictions are discussed in Subsection 2.2. The three lines are the 10th
percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.
29Figure 3: Empirical Impulse Responses: Sign Restrictions 1 and 2, K = 4









































−3 Level of Employment
quarters
Notes: The three sign restrictions are discussed in Subsection 2.2. The three lines are the 10th
percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.
30Figure 4: Empirical Impulse Responses: Sign Restrictions 1 and 2, K = 2








































−3 Level of Employment
quarters
Notes: The three sign restrictions are discussed in Subsection 2.2. The three lines are the 10th
percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.
31Figure 5: Variance Decomposition for Employment Growth and Vacancies: Sign restrictions
1, 2 and 3 are imposed. K = 4.



























Notes: The sign restrictions are discussed in Subsection 2.2. The three lines are the 10th
percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.
32Figure 6: Variance Decomposition for Employment Growth and Vacancies: Sign restrictions
1, 2 and 3 are imposed. K = 4. Responses of vacancies in the impact period are restricted
to be negative.



























Notes: The sign restrictions are discussed in Subsection 2.2. The three lines are the 10th
percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.
33Figure 7: Impulse Responses: Endogenous Separation












































34Figure 8: Comparison between Model Impulse Responses and Empirical Impulse Responses:
Endogenous Separation
















































Notes: Responses in the model economy are shown by the thick solid lines. Other lines plot the
empirical responses that are taken from Figure 1. All responses are expressed as deviations from
the steady-state levels. Responses of vacancies and employment are expressed as log deviations.
35Figure 9: Impulse Responses: Fixed Separation Rate






























36Figure 10: Comparison between Model Impulse Responses and Empirical Impulse Responses:
Fixed Separation Rate





































Notes: Responses in the model economy are shown by the thick solid lines. Other lines plot the
empirical responses that are taken from Figure 1. All responses are expressed as deviations from
the steady-state levels. Responses of vacancies and employment are expressed as log deviations.
37